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1994-05-02
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<text>
<title>
Health Effects of Nuclear Weapons Production
</title>
<article>
<hdr>
Facing Reality: The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex
Health Effects of Nuclear Weapons Production: DOE Research
</hdr>
<body>
<p>(Adapted from Dead Reckoning: A Critical Review of the
Department of Energy's Epidemiologic Studies, a report to be
released by Physicians for Social Responsibility in May 1992.)
</p>
<p>by H. Jack Geiger, M.D. and Daryl G. Kimball
</p>
<p> A basic function of government is to protect the health and
safety of its citizens. But when a single government agency
creates threats to health and safety--and is charged with
giving protection from those hazards, the production activity
will clash with safety.
</p>
<p> Nowhere is this conflict of interest more conspicuous than in
the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The Complex produces and handles
extremely toxic and radioactive materials, and it has used its
immunity from checks and balances to distort and conceal
scientific research aimed at understanding the risks it imposes
on workers and nearby populations.
</p>
<p> Secrecy shields not only the design, manufacture and testing
of nuclear weapons--with their clear national security
implications--but also basic data on radiation and toxic
releases, and on workers' exposures and health. Independent
scientific studies of illness and death in potentially affected
workers and nearby communities have often been impossible.
</p>
<p> For more than 40 years, occupational and public health
monitoring at the weapons plants was the duty of DOE and its
predecessors, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Energy
Research and Development Administration. Much of this
responsibility was passed on to the agencies' contractors. An
essential component of such an effort is epidemiologic study,
which should entail:
</p>
<p>-- precise, continuous definition and measurement of radiation
and other toxic exposures;
</p>
<p>-- careful long-term tracking of the distribution of illness and
death among workers and surrounding communities;
</p>
<p>-- meticulous comparison with the health outcomes of
less-exposed or unexposed individuals;
</p>
<p> How well has the government dealt with its responsibility to
investigate the health impact of its nuclear weapons
activities? Both during and after its worst abuses, the Complex
has violated the principles of unfettered scientific
investigation as consistently as it has violated environmental
and safety concerns.
</p>
<p> In official publications, Congressional testimony, and press
releases, government assurances about the health impact of the
Complex were unvarying. While often lacking data to support
their claims, officials of the Complex asserted that all
necessary occupational health and safety precautions were in
force, that rarely, if ever, had there been serious accidents or
hazardous releases to the environment, and that there was no
immediate threat to public health.
</p>
<p> For example, in the 1950s at the Nevada Test Site, the AEC's
radiation safety committee's internal guidelines stated that
"we have tried to keep in mind the somewhat delicate
public-relations aspect of the affair.... It is felt that
figures [on fallout levels] must be used as general guides but
that no drastic action which might disturb the public should be
taken unless it is clearly felt that such action is essential to
protect local residents from almost certain damage. It is
assumed that any member of the general public may receive
external exposure up to 25 rem without danger." (U.S. District
Court Memorandum Opinion, Allen vs. USA, Civil No. C 79-0515-J,
May 10, 1984.) This assumption contrasts sharply with U.S.
standards at the time for maximum annual radiation exposure.
For the general public, 0.5 rem were allowed in 1956, 0.17 rem
by 1960. For nuclear workers the standard was 5 rem beginning
in 1957.
</p>
<p> For the first two decades of nuclear weapons production,
although measurements of radiation exposure (for some, not all)
nuclear weapons workers were taken, the government failed to do
thorough health effects research. The only tacit
acknowledgement of risk came in 1963, when atmospheric weapons
tests were banned. But this change was opposed, not initiated,
by the AEC. Vehement protest over radioactive fallout was the
stimulus, and the public was informed by independent scientists
who collected their own data on radioactive contamination.
</p>
<p> The first comprehensive epidemiologic study of the workforce
was initiated in the mid-1960s by researchers from the
University of Pittsburgh, led by Dr. Thomas Mancuso. His group
published evidence of excess cancer risk at Hanford, in a
peer-reviewed journal. Their AEC contract was then canceled and
they were denied further access to the health data they had
collected.
</p>
<p> There have been other incidents of intimidation, censure and
dismissal of scientists whose results were regarded as harmful
to the interests of the Complex. In 1986, Dr. Gregg Wilkinson,
an epidemiologist working for the DOE's Los Alamos National
Laboratory, circulated the draft of a paper to be submitted to a
respected peer-reviewed publication, the American Journal of
Epidemiology, showing an excess of brain cancer among Rocky
Flats workers.
</p>
<p> According to sworn testimony, one supervisor at Los Alamos
told Dr. Wilkinson that he should do research "to please the
DOE, your sponsors, not satisfy peer reviewers." (Public
Hearings before the Secretarial Panel for the Evaluation of
Epidemiologic Research Activities, Chicago, IL, October, 1989.)
Wilkinson was pressured to withdraw the paper, a request that
was canceled only when he threatened to resign. The DOE made no
effort to publicize the findings--in contrast to a major
public relations effort that had followed publication of a very
preliminary Wilkinson paper on Rocky Flats that contained no
positive findings.
</p>
<p> The past several years have seen a steady stream of reports
from DOE and contractor scientists who were treated as hostile
"whistleblowers" for reporting findings of unusual health risk,
or for questioning DOE methods and assurances. Such practices
can do real damage to scientific inquiry and increase public
skepticism about reassurances contained in DOE-sponsored
scientific studies.
</p>
<p> The credibility of DOE-supervised health research was eroded
further in 1986--again with an outside impetus. Public
concern following the Chernobyl accident led Secretary of Energy
John Herrington to ask the National Academy of Sciences to
assess the safety of DOE reactors (some of them similar in
design to Chernobyl) that produced nuclear weapons materials.
The resulting report described major accidents, melted fuel,
radioactive contamination, serious structural defects, gross
violations of safe operating procedures, and inadequate DOE
oversight of contractors. (Committee to Assess Safety and
Technical Issues at DOE Reactors.) Major environmental and
safety violations, and evidence of contamination, were found at
almost every major DOE facility.
</p>
<p> Trust in the government's 40-year record of assurances that
no threats to human health had ever occurred was severely
damaged by this series of revelations. Current Energy Secretary
James D. Watkins' admitted that the Complex had been "cloaked in
secrecy and imbued with a dedication to the production of
nuclear weapons without a real sensitivity for protecting the
environment".
</p>
<p> Watkins, facing a lawsuit against DOE calling for release of
the Mancuso health data, and with pending Congressional
legislation that would transfer health research from DOE to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), appointed a panel
to investigate the DOE epidemiology program. The Secretarial
Panel for the Evaluation of Epidemiologic Research Activities
(SPEERA) held public hearings from September 1989 to March 1990.
SPEERA strongly backed full public participation in
epidemiologic research on the Complex. In